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Executive Summary
l. Two fundamental problems have been figuring persistently on the agenda of
SADC since its inception as a 'conference' in 1980: donor dependency and
institutional structure. Much thought and soul-searching discussion have gone into
attempts to grapple with these issues. Yet, the problems remain basically
unresolved. This report constitutes yet another attempt at finding a solution, albeit
partial, to these twin problems. The question of setting up a capacity-building fund
cannot be divorced from the broader issue of institutional structure.
2. When SADCC was formed in 1980 a decentralised institutional structure was
adopted with a view to avoiding top-heavy bureaucratisation with high overhead
costs; mobilising Member States and ensuring their direct and active involvement
in the organisation's affairs by allocating sectoral responsibilities to them; and
creating a high profile to promote and maintain visibilty throughout the region
through the activities of the Sector Coordinating Units (SCUs).
3. The founders of SADCC deliberately opted for consensus in decision-making.
The cost of this operational modality, however, has been relative slowness of
progress. Faced with the challenges of the 1990's it was increasingly felt that,
while the original institutional framework had been appropriate for the 1980's, it
would be inadequate for the future. On 17 August 1992 the Summt adopted a
Treaty establishing the Southern Africa Development Community intended to
transform the organisation from a loose assemblage of like-minded states into a
firmer and better instrument for regional integration. The ambitious objectives of
the Treaty were not matched by fundamental changes in the institutional
framework of the Community to equip the organisation with the necessary
instruments to meet the new challenges. The mode of operation of the new SADC
was not transformed.
4. The most serious shortcoming of the Treaty in terms of institutional provisions
is the glaring omission of reference to the SCUs. As a matter of formality it is
correct that the SCUs are strictly speaking not part of the institutional framework
of SADC. Formally they are not regional institutions but national entities
integrated into the state apparatus of the country holding responsibility for the
sector concerned. Even though the SCUs are technically national units, they are
critical to the functioning of SADC, of which they are a vital part organically, if
not legally. The SCUs form the backbone of SADC, without which the
decentralised mode of operation would not work. On account of their operational
importance it is disturbing that the SCUs were neglected in the Treaty.
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5. However, the Treaty laid the basis for continued evolution of the institutional
framework, e.g. the upgrading of SCUs to commission status. Nevertheless, . in
recognition of the likelihood that SCUs would continue to perform important
functions for a considerable time to come, a saving provision was inc1uded.
Pending significant changes in SADC' s mode of operation, therefore, the
institutional impediments of the past are likely to continue hampering progress.
The old framework may have served the organisation well in the first decade but
new and tougher challenges of deepening integration wil require new and more
effective instruments.
6. The problem of inter-organisational rivalry between PTA and SADC has
compounded the institutional question for some time. OverIapping mandates and
membership have been cause for concern that efforts are being duplicated and
meagre resources wasted. The two summits of the respective organisations in
August and December 1994 failed to resolve the conflct. The fact that a workable
modus operandi has not been reached does not allay the concerns of the donor
community.
7. The desire to prevent the swelling of SADC' s bureaucracy to unmanageable
levels has evolved into a bureaucratic leanness axiom to the point of creating
bottlenecks in the organisation which hamper progress with regard to the new
agenda. The policy of keeping bureaucracy (i.e. number of staff) to a bare
minimum has been implemented toa scrupulously. It may be surmised from
various documents that shortage of qualified staff and capacity are factors which
seriously impede progress. There is a case for judicious expansion of the
bureaucracy of SADC institutions, inc1uding both the Secretariat and the SCUs.
8. Expanding the capacity of an institution can be done in three ways: (a)
increasing the total working time available to complete the assignments at hand,
i.e. increasing the staff complement through new recruitment; (b) enhancing the
efficiency of existing staff by various means without increasing the number of
staff, I.e. makng more economical use of available resources and deploying staff
more rationally; and (c) combining staff expansion, i.e. option (a), and taking
efficiency measures, i.e. option (b). This would be the most effective option and
is the recommended one.
9. The Capacity-Building Fund is intended to have a dual function. First, it is
designed to enhance institutional capacities for regional integration by way of a
number of interventions and support measures. Second, once capacities have been
expanded, the Fund would - for an initial period - provide recurrent expenditure
support.
10. The critical hurdle in establishing a capacity-building fund is likely to be its
capitalisation. Potential sources inc1ude: (a) revenue generated through activities
such as football matches, pop concerts, lotteries, hotel bed levy etc.; (b) voluntary
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contributions from civil society in Southern Africa; (c) voluntar contributions
from SADC Member States; (b) assessed contributions from SADC Member
States, either on a flat rate basis or according to a specified formula of
differentiation; (d) voluntary contributions from the donor community, both
bilateral and multilateral agencies; (e) voluntar contributions from the private
sector in Southern Africa, principally from individual companies; (t) voluntary
contributions from the private sector in other parts of the worId, principally from
individual companies; (g) temporary levy on trade transactions within the Southern
African Customs Union for a fixed term or up to a targeted volume.
11. Whereas all of the potential sources may be tapped, the most effective and
fastest way to capitalise the Fund to the level required would be to impose a small
levy on trade transactions within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
This arrangement would be temporary and last only until the targeted amount has
been reached. The greatest attraction of this option is its practicabilty in that the
functioning administrative machinery for collecting the levy is in place. The main
reservation is that only a minority of SADC's Member States would thus capitalise
the Fund, whereas all of them would benefit from its operations.
12. The report outlines a number of expenditure and management assumptions, on
the basis of which an attempt is made at quantifying the resources which wil be
required to be commtted to the Fund in order for it to constitute a viable source
of financial support. On the basis of these assumptions the required capital base
of the Fund is estimated to be within the range of US$ 4.4 mil. to US$ 16.7 mill.
13. It is recognised that there is an absolute need for the Fund to be established
within the framework of the Treaty and the existing Protocols to the Treaty. None
of the provisions of the Treaty and its Protocols are considered to be adequate to
provide for the establishment of a discrete and effective constitution for the Fund
without being supplemented by new provisions in the form of a Protocol to the
Treaty. It is recommended, therefore, that a new Protocol be adopted which
establishes the Fund as an Institution of SADC. The provisions of the Protocol
would need to be in harmony with the existing provisions which relate to the
management of the resources of SADC.
14. In order to maintain adequate flexibility in the conduct of the affairs of the
Fund as these may evolve, it is suggested that the Protocol establishing the Fund
should not embody the constitution of the Fund. It is recommended that the
Protocol authorise the Council of Ministers to adopt the detailed constitution and
that, once adopted, the said constitution be amendable only by the CounciL. It is
recommended that the consultative proeess which the Secretariat has adopted as
the procedure for the formulation of protocols be abbreviated to that which is
necessary in order to finalise the draft Protocol and for the Protocol to be
submitted directly to the Council of Ministers. This suggestion is motivated by the
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understanding that the Protocol in question relates to an administrative matter and
is not relevant to a specific area of cooperation.
15. It is proposed that the Fund be managed by a Board of Governors which
would comprise up to ten members. Although the Executive Secretary of SADC
could, ex officio, be a member of the Board of Governors, it is recommended that
the members of the Board of Governors be drawn from outside of the SADC
Secretariat. The members of the Board of Governors should have sufficient
financial acumen and stature in the financial community to ensure that the Fund
would be run in accordance with its constitution. The Board of Governors would
play a supervisory role.
16. It is proposed further that the Fund be managed by an independent financial
institution selected by the Board of Governors pursuant to atender procedure. This
institution should be selected on the basis of its financial acumen and stature in
the international investment community. The institution so selected would enter
into an investment management agreement with the Fund pursuant to which its
services and remuneration would be specified in detaiL. It is recommended that the
Fund appoint a sec ond financial institution, which meets predetermined credit
rating requirements, as the custodian of the Fund' s assets.
17. The investment manager would be required to invest the assets of the Fund in
accordance with the restrictions imposed in the constitution and with a view to
achieving the investment objectives set out therein. The investment manager
would, furthermore, make quarterIy presentations to the Board of Governors and
support these presentations by detailed financial reports which would be made
available to the SADC Executive Secretary and all Member States.
18. It is proposed that the investment objectives of the Fund be formulated in such
a manner as would limit the risk to which the assets are put. The constitution of
the Fund should establish detailed investment restrictions which would limit the
risk to which the assets of the Fund would be exposed. The constitution of the
Fund should prescribe the accounting treatment of the assets of the Fund and
specify the nature of the reports which are required to be presented to the
supervisory Board of Governors. It is essential that the Fund be subject to audit
by independent auditors, and in this reg ard it is recommended that the auditors be
different to those which audit the accounts of SADC. The Fund wil have no
employees nor should the SADC Secretariat fulfil any functions in relation to the
administration of its assets or of its accounting.
19. A draft constitution for the Fund is inc1uded in the report.
20. A draft Protocol establishing the Fund as an Institution of SADC is appended.
vii
1. SADC's Institutional Framework
Two fundamental problems have been figuring persistently on the agenda of
SADC since its inception as a 'conference' in 1980: donor dependency and
institutional structure. Much thought and soul-searching discussion have gone into
attempts to grapple with these issues, not only by officials of the organisation but
also more broadly by civil society and academic analysts in the region and
beyond. A number of studies, reports and memoranda have been produced in
search of solutions. Yet, little progress has been made and the problems remain
basically unresolved. This report constitutes yet another attempt at finding a
solution, albeit partial, to these twin problems. Although a capacity-building fund
is meant to address, in some measure, the donor dependency problem through the
creation of a vehic1e for intra-regional resource mobilsation, donor support for its
capitalisation should not be ruled out entirely. Even so, regardless of sources of
capitalisation, the principal function of such a fund would be to address the serious
problem of institutional capacity. In turn, capacity is related to the institutional set-
up of SADC in general, its efficiency and lines of authority. In this sense the
establishment of a capacity-building fund goes to the core of SADC's institutional
problem. In fact, the question of setting up a capacity-building fund cannot be
divorced from the broader issue of institutional structure. Hence the need for an
initial discussion of the institutions of SADC.
1.1 A Retrospective Review
When SADCC was forme d in 1980 a decentralised institutional structure was
adopted, whose underIying rationale may be summarised in three main points.1
(a) Avoiding top-heavy bureaucratisation with high overhead costs. The risk of
Member States accumulating arrears to cover institutional costs could thus be
averted or minimised. In this respect the experiences from the East African
Community (EAC) had undoubtedly acted as a deterrent;
(b) Mobilising Member States and ensuring their direct and active involvement in
the organisation' s affairs by allocating sectoral responsibilties to them. A
highly centralised structure might demobilse or pacify member states in that
they might be tempted to refer responsibilities to central bodies which would
be seen to be acting on behalf of the entire organisation;
1 These points emanate from offcial documents and interviews with SADC(C) offciaIs.
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(c) Creating a high profil e to promote and maintain visibility throughout the
region through the activities of the Sector Coordinating Units (SCUs). This
would be politically important, not least in the initial stages.
It may be said of this approach to regional collaboration that it was singularly
'functionalist and bottom-up, as opposed to a top-down supra-national mode of
operation.2 It became the hallmark of the erstwhile SADCC, which has continued
to distinguish it from previous and contemporary regional ventures. Consonant
with the initial pragmatie and non-bureaucratic spirit, no truly supra-national
institutions have been created to date, not even after the transformation of the
'conference' into a community.
The concept of supra-nationality is equivocal because its usage has not been
consistent.3 International organisations between states, i.e. intergovernmental
organisations, may be grouped into four broad categories:
(a) Intergovernmental organisations with purely consultative or advisory functions.
They are not mandated to take decisions which are binding on their member
states;
(b) Intergovernmental organisations which may take decisions which are binding
on their member states, but only in so far as such decisions are based on
consensus or unanimity among the membership. SADC falls into this category;
(c) Intergovernmental organisations whose supra-national authority is based on the
voluntary ceding of sovereignty by member states in specified fields as laid
down in a formal agreement with proper status in terms of internationallaw.
The enforcement of decisions is only considered legitimate if the member
states concerned have expressly authorised it beforehand, e.g. in the
membership terms, the use of certain means of enforcement;
(d) Federations which are unions of states in which the control of the external
relations of all the member states has been permanently surrendered to a
2 The term 'functionalist refers to one strand of thinking within the theory of integration,
espoused particularly by Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and
International Organisations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) and by David Mitrany,
'The Prospects of Integration: Federal or Functional', in Journal of Common Market Studies,
voL. iv, no. 2, 1963. Its main tenet is that regional integration is more likely to succeed if
approached pragmatically in 'functional' areas on a step-by-step basis so as to weave gradually
a web of integrative relations between states. The 'bottom-up approach' refers to the way in
which project proposals are processed within the organisation, from the national leve! to the
Council of Ministers for approval and inclusion in the Programme of Action. It does not imply
that SADC(C) activities have necessarily been generated by popular grassroots initiatives.
3 This section draws on Jon Hovi, 'Overnasjonalitet ('Supra-nationality'), in Internasjonal
Politikk, voL. 49, no. 1, 1991, pp. 5-17. See also C. Parryet aL. (eds.), Encyclopedic Dictionary
of International Law, (New York: Ocean a Publications, 1986) and B. Sen, A Diplomats
Handbook of International Law and Practice, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979).
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central governing body so that the only state which exists for international
purposes is the state formed by such a union.
An intergovernmental organisation may thus be called supra-national in the full
sense of the term only if it satisfies the following criteria:
(i) The member states have ceded sovereignty in limited and specified fields to
a higher organisational body so that authority is conferred on that body to
make decisions and implement them on behalf of the constituent member
states;
(ii) The ceding of sovereignty has been made on a voluntary basis;
(iii) The ceding of sovereignty is irrevocable in the short term so as to make it
impossible for a member state to restore decision-making authority to its own
nationalorgans with immediate effect;
(iv) The ceding of sovereignty is limited in the sense that the member states wil
retain their international status as independent actors in other fields of
activity.
Jf an intergovernmental organisation satisfies the above criteria it wil have the
following properties in terms of decision-making:
(i) Authority and capability to make decisions binding on member states;
(ii) Authority and capability to make decisions binding on members states even
against the wil of reluctant or resisting member states; ,
(iii) Possession of adequate means to enforce decisions even in the face of
opposition or reluctance by certain member states;
(iv) A minimum of financial autonomy as a basis for enforcement of decisions;
(v) Legal restrictions on immediate withdrawal from the organisation by member
states.
The international community has to date not seen a single intergovernmental
organisation which satisfies all these criteria as a fully-fledged supra-national
entity. But in real international politics it is often a question of degrees. The
Security Council of the United Nations appears to conform to most of the criteria,
but not all. It falls short in terms of financial autonomy; the veto right of the
permanent members also introduces limitations on its authority to function as a
supra-national actor. The European Union has also gone some way towards
becoming a supra-national body but not yet as far as the Security CounciL.
Controversy still surrounds the Maastricht Treaty and most analysts find its
implementation schedule unrealistic.
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In an increasingly interdependent worId the notion of national sovereignty needs
to be re-examined.4 The assumption hardly holds true any longer that the nation-
state exercises sovereign controlover its own fate, subject only to compromises
it must make and limits imposed upon it by actors, agencies and forces operating
within its territorial boundaries. The dynamics of the worId economy, the rapid
growth of transnational links and major changes to the nature of internationallaw
encroaches in a fundamental way upon the sovereignty of any nation-state. But
this applies a fortiori to nation-states of the Third WorId whose vulnerabilty to
global proeesses are more pronounced. As a result, the question of formal ceding
of sovereignty in terms of intergovernmental agreements is reduced in real
importance, even though it remains important symbolically.
Notwithstanding the definitions and formalities of supra-national organisations, the
real politics of international relations determine, in the last instance, the
workability of such organisations. History has shown that supra-national
federations have broken up because strains have been allowed to build up over a
number of years to a point where one or more sub-federal entities have found it
intolerable to remain a member state. Such strains frequently have to do with the
allocation of costs and benefits. Some poorer or less endowed member states may
perceive that intra-federal exploitation has become built into the decision-making
structures to their detriment, whereas richer member states may feel they are not
getting their fair share of the cake relative to their contribution. In most cases
equity issues have been at the root of disruption and put in question the very
legitimacy of the arrangement.
Historically, bureaucratic institutions with some supra-national powers have tended
to swell in size and become expensive, and have thus imposed a financial burden
on the member states. In the developing worId many countries llave thus
accumulated arrears which, in turn, have constrained the effectiveness and
manoeuvrabilty of the organisation to which they ought to owe allegiance. Such
situations may have arisen simply due to the inability to pay membership fees or
any other assessment levied on the member states.
But arrears may also have developed by design on the part of certain member
states because they fe el that their supra-national bodies have become forces in
their own right, quasi-independent of the common wil of the member states.
Accumulation of arrears may in such cases be interpreted in political terms as
some form of protest or at least as an indication of unease or waning commtment.
Research on institutional behaviour suggests that institutions may develop a self-
interest in their own survival and preservation. But no institutions operate in a
political and economic vacuum as far as strategic direction is concerned; generally
4 See David Held, , Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System', in Economy and
Society, voL. 20, no. 2, 1991, pp. 138-172.
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it is the stronger member states of regional organisations which manage to assert
their interests through such supra-national bodies not bound by consensus in their
decision-making procedures.5
In contradistinction to supra-national models the original SADCC opted for
consensus in decision-making in its initial phase. A fine distinction may be drawn
between consensus and unanimity. On occasion SADC(C) has pushed ahead by
coaxing and cajoling, even when some Member States may have had reservations
or apprehensions about the direction in which the organisation was going. In
operational terms, i.e. in terms of approval and implementation of projects, which
has been the core activity, it would be very difficult for one member state to slow
down progress, as long as the countries directly involved were keen, and there was
general support for the programme in question. The consensus principle means that
every effort is being made to bring all Member States along, even the wavering
and reluctant ones. It is not quite the same as unanimity which normally implies
that a vote is taken. It would be correct to say, then, that SADC(C) organs have
taken decisions to date which have had a variable degree of active support by
Member States, although never directly opposed by any of them. Having said that,
however, any lack of commitment and enthusiasm on the part of particular
Member States would, of course, adversely affect the rate of progress in
implementing decisions pertaining to the sec tor coordinated by the very same
Member State.
Flowing from the consensus principle the direction of activities and the tempo of
pro gress has thus been based on the lowest common denominator. In operational
terms one may say that the slowest and least wiling Member State has had a
disproportionate influence on the direction and tempo of the organisation -
virtually a veto right, albeit not in a formalised sense. The selection of this option
in 1980 was a conscious choice in recognition of the heterogeneity of the Member
States. Rather than being an instrument for coalescing disparate interests into a
powerful force for rapid change, supra-national institutions have of ten - unless
safeguard mechanisms have been build into their machinery to ensure equity in the
distribution of cost and benefits - proved to be developing into the opposite: a
divisive mechanism. The founders of SADCC deliberately preferred a consensus
model to a vanguard supra-national structure which, by moving too far ahead too
fast, might threaten to disrupt the entire cooperative venture. Consequently,
relative slowness of pro gress has been the co st of the operational modality opted
for.
5 See, inter alia, the survey article by Constantine V. Vaitsos, 'Crisis in Regional Economic
Cooperation (Integration) among Developing Countries: A Survey', in World Development, voL.
6, no. 6, 1978, pp. 719-769.
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The benefits of such a decentralised and 'functionalist approach may be discerned
in the achievements under the Programme of Action, and in the fact that SADCC
in its 'conference' era was a viable and dynamic organisation. In view of past
experiences in regional cooperation elsewhere that is no mean accomplishment.
Organisational cohesion today is one of the main benefits of this institutional
approach. The middle-of-the-road approach adopted has arguably averted the
creation of new or the reinforcement of existing regional disparities. The politics
of the organisation has ensured that the reaping of net benetïts from regional
collaboration has been distributed with reasonable equity among the Member
States.
The bulk of the work under SADC auspices takes place in the SCUs (and in the
two commissions SA TCC and SACCAR) in conjunction with the formulation,
amendment and implementation of the Programme of Action. They have
responsibility for liaison and consultation with both Member States and the donor
community, as well as for providing leadership, policy analysis and technical
services to advance the sectoral programme in question. They convene and service
the Sectoral Commttees, and organise, as required, ad hoc sectoral consultative
single-purpose meetings with donors. An important task is the preparation of a
sectoral strategy to provide guidanee for project selection and prioritisation.
Moreover, they are actively involved in project identification, screening, appraisal
and design in c10se consultation with the member state(s) where projects are
physically located. They may also, on request, assist Member States in
negotiations with donors on financing etc.
After a decade's experience with the above institutional framework and faced with
the challenges of the 1990's it was increasingly felt that, while the original
institutional framework had been appropriate for the 1980's, it would probably be
inadequate for the future. After thorough preparation by a formalisation committee
of eminent persons and careful deliberation by all decision-making organs of the
organisation, it was decided to opt for a community.
1.2 Creating the Southern AfrIcan Development Community
On 17 August 1992 the Summit meeting of SADCC adopted three important
documents intended to transform the organisatioii from a fairIy loose assemblage
of like-minded states into a firmer and better instrument for regional integration.
These documents include:
(a) Towards the Southem African Development Community. A Declaration by the
Heads of State or Government of Southem African States;
(b) Treaty of the Southem African Development Community;
(c) Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Southem African Development
Community on Immunities and Privileges.
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This formalisation into a community by way of a Treaty represented no doubt a
step in the right direction. But, quite apart from the many merits of formalisation,
this fact did not in itself address adequately either the problem of donor
dependency or that of institutional structure.
To be true, some mention of donor dependency was made in the Windhoek
Dec1aration. Despite its commitment to regional integration and mobilisation of the
region's own resources to that end, the Declaration concedes that "... Southern
Africa is stil a developing region which wil continue to need the support of the
international community to realise its plans and aspirations."6 Similar sentiments
were expressed in the preamble to the Treaty and in its article 5. The major
objective of dependency reduction contained in the Lusaka Declaration of 1980
had been dropped.7 Anyhow, it was perhaps not to be expected that donor
dependenee be highlighted in formal documents of this nature.
The Treaty was adopted at a time when the global and regional environments were
changing fundamentally . The collapse of the Soviet system had put an end to the
cold war, with major consequences for Southern Africa. With the immnent
transition to majority rule in South Africa, prospects for regional peace and
development were greatly enhanced. Policies of economic and political
liberalisation were increasingly taking hold throughout the region, laying a better
foundation for cooperation at a higher leveL.
These changes were reflected in the increasingly ambitious objectives of the
Treaty, i.e. regional integration in its fulle st sense. However, the new enlarged and
ambitious agenda was not matched by fundamental changes in the institutional
framework of the Community, equipping the organisation with the necessary
instruments to meet the new challenges. The mode of operation of the new SADC
was not transformed.
The Tribunal is an institutional novelty, however. The loose nature of SADCC
based on consensus decisions across the board did not require a mechanism for
adjudication upon conflcts. Such conflcts were unlikely to arise. That situation
has since changed. Although the principle of consensus decision-making is stil
upheld, the very formalisation of the organisation in terms of the Treaty and
increased stress on enforcement of binding decisions may cause conflcts to
emerge with respect to the interpretation of legal provisions and concomitant
decisions by organs of the organisation. Hence the need for a TribunaL.
6
Southern African Development Community, Declaration, Treaty and Protocol of the Southern
African Development Community, Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, not dated, p. 10.
7 Reduction of dependence on apartheid South Africa is, of course, no longer relevant. But
reduction of extra-regional dependence is indeed a serious problem stil.
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Disputes which cannot be settled amicably may be referred to the Tribunal for
adjudication. Evidently the intention is not to set up a standing Tribunal as a
permament institution. It would rather function on an ad hoc basis, as and when
required. The specifics of its composition, powers, functions and procedures were
to be prescribed in a separate protocol adopted by the Summit.
The Summt and the Council may request advisory opinions from the TribunaL. 8
But the rulings in disputes referred to the Tribunal shall be final and binding.9
There is no recourse to appeaL. The establishment of a Tribunal testifies to the
increased preoccupation with enforcement of decisions in furtherance of the goals
of the organisation.
Another mechanism of enforcement is contained in Article 33 on sanctions.1O The
inclusion of a provision like this suggests that the signatories do not fin d it
inconceivable that some among them may find binding decisions difficult to
comply with, even when they are based on consensus at the outset. The
complexity and new agenda of deepening regional integration in post-apartheid
Southern Africa underscores the need for compliance. The sanctions mechanism
thus represents the 'stick' of the organisation, while its mode of operation is
generally informed by consensus and goodwilL. A Treaty involves legal
obligations, and failure to fulfil them wil provoke sanctions by the other members
represented in the Summit.
There are two types of failure to meet obligations. One is the case when a
Member State is persistently inactive in furthering the cause of the organisation
for no acceptable reason, including failure to pay assessed contributions to joint
activities. The other one is more serious, I.e. when a member state wilfully
implements policies which undermine or run counter to the principles and
objectives of the organisation.
The kind of sanctions that may be imposed are not specified in the Treaty. It shall
be determined by the Summt on a case-by-case basis. Presumably suspension of
membership wil be within the range of sanctions that may be applied in extreme
cases, though unlikely in the context of the real politics of regional affairs. The
political cost would probably be too high.
The most serious shortcoming of the Treaty in terms of institutional provisions is
the glaring omission of reference to the SCUsY As a matter of formality it is
correct, of course, that the SCUs are strictly spe aking not part of the institutional
8 Article 16, subsection 4 of the Treaty, p. 16.
9
Article 16, subsection 5 of the Treaty, p. 16.
10 Article 33 of the Treaty, p. 24.
11
Article 9 of the Treaty, p. 10.
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framework of SADC. Formally the SCUs are not regional institutions but national
entities integrated into the state apparatus of the country holding responsibility for
the sector concerned. The Member State designates a coordinator for a functional
area or sector and is responsible for the staffing and running of the SCUs in
question, inc1uding funding. General assessment is not imposed on the member
states to defray the cost of the SCUs, but additional funding and technical
assistance may be sought from extra-regional sources. But, even though the SCUs
are technically national units, they are critical to the functioning of SADC as an
organisation, of which they are a vital part organically, if not legally. The SCUs
may be said to form the backbone of SADC, without which the decentralised
mode of operation would not work. In practice they correspond to the sectoral
commssions and perform basically the same functions but do not have the same
legal status.
Against the backdrop that the weakness of the SCU s to date has been an
acknowledged problem of major proportions for the progress of the organisation,
it is surprising that the Treaty failed to address this problem adequately. On
account of their operational importanee it is disturbing that the SCUs were
neglected in the Treaty. As a matter of fact, it is the work of the SCUs which in
practice wil determine the success or failure of SADC.
Yet, the Treaty did lay the basis for continued evolution of the institutional
framework, e.g. the upgrading of SCUs to commission status. It appears that the
omission of SCUs in the listing of SADC institutions12 was made on the
assumption that existing SCUs would be replaced by commissions in due course.
However, in recognition of the likelihood that SCUs would continue to perform
important functions for a considerable time to come, a saving provision13 was
included, but no transitional c1ause. Pending significant changes in SADC' s mode
of operation, therefore, the institutional impediments of the past are likely to
continue hampering progress.
The authority accorded the Secretariat was not strengthened by the Treaty. The
Secretariat was not given discretionary powers to take initiatives on its own with
concomitant authority to direct the organisation's total activities. This comes out
most clearIy in the relationship between the Secretariat and the SCUs. The adopted
articles are phrased cautiously as exemplified by the following on the functions
of the Executive Secretary:14
12
Article 9 of the Treaty, p. 10.
13 Article 38 of the Treaty, p. 27.
14
Article 15, subsection 2 of the Treaty, p. 16.
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The Executive Secretary shallliaise closely with Commissions, and other institutions, and
guide, support and monitor the performance of SADC in the various sectors to ensure
conformity and harmony with agreed policies, strategies, programmes and projects.
The above institutions of SADC proper are charged with implementation of
decisions in tandem with national institutions of the individual member states, i.e.
SCUs and a plethora of others. Consequently, the appropriateness and efficiency
of the institutional framework is critical to progress bein g made. For outsiders it
is indeed astounding that the largely old institutional framework of the former
'conference' was considered adequate to handle the new objectives, heightened
ambitions and broadened agenda of the Community towards deeper integration.
The old framework may have served the organisation well in the first decade of
its existence, but new and tougher challenges of deepening integration would
appear to require new and more effective instruments.
Evidently, SADC openly questions its own institutions on the very same basis as
borne out by the tellng quotation below:15
The new mission envisaged for SADC in the Treaty is more complex than SADC's
coordination agenda. This raises major questions about whether the organisation and
management systems inherited from SADCC are capable of delivering the new and more
complex agenda. If SADC is to deliver on its mission, fundamental changes wil be
essential throughout the organisation. The challenge is whether the institutions created to
facilitate coordination can be transformed into instruments of effective equitable
economic integration. The transformation wil require a substantial reorientation of the
Organisation's culture, formal structures, management systems and procedures to firmly
focus on all these on delivering results.
Legal instruments notwithstanding, it is the real worId of practical day-to-day
operations which matters. Indications are that all the decision-making organs and
the Secretariat staff have become increasingly aware that the present institutional
structure, legally a Community or not, is incommensurate with the tasks at hand.
But no definitive solution has crystallsed as yet.
The problem of inter-organisational rivalry between PT A and SADC has
compounded the institutional question for quite some time. OverIapping mandates
and membership have been cause for concern that efforts are being duplicated and
meagre resources wasted. Attempts have been mounted to harmonise, rationalise
and coordinate the activities of the two organisations. A Joint Commttee of
Ministers with six members, three from each organisation, was appointed with a
view to finding a workable solution. In mid-1994 a joint PTNSADC study was
15 SADC, A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, Gaborone: SADC Secretariat,
not dated, p. 22.
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commssioned towards that end.16 A number of options were considered and a
way appeared to have been found out of the impasse. The Joint Committee of
Ministers recommended the option which seemed to command broadest suport: a
status quo, allowing both organisations to continue to co-exist with dual
membership, with the proviso that a Consultative Committee comprising the
chairmen of the respective Councils of Ministers of the two organisation be
established to ensure harmonisation, coordination and rationalisation of activities.
On 29 August 1994 the SADC Summit, after having reviewed the study report and
deliberated on its recommendations and that of the Joint Committee of Ministers,
rejected the latter. Instead, the Summit17
adopted option 4 recommended by the Consultants, which provides for splitting of the
Region covered by the PTA into two regions, i.e. PTA-North and PTA-South comprising
the eleven SADC member States. SADC member States which are also members of the
PTA would have to exercIse their sovereign right in withdrawing from the latter in order
to allow for emergence of two separate organisations which would work together for the
promotion of the AEC. (...) The Summit agreed to give SADC member States time to
implement this decision.
For its part, three months later, at its meeting on 8-9 December 1994, the Summt
of the COMESA Authority:18
endorsed the report and recommendations of the Joint Ministerial Committee that a
Consultative Committee comprising the Chairmen of the respective Council of Ministers
of the two groupings should be established to pursue on a regular basis, the issues of
harmonisation, coordination and rationalisation of the activities of the COMESA and
SADC;
However, cognizant of the decision by the SADC Summit only three months
previously, the COMESA Summt also: 19
agreed that in order to enhance the spirit of cooperation, COMESA and SADC Member
States should consult on modalities of convening a joint extra-ordinary COMESA/SADC
Summit of Heads of State and Government to be held in the near future to take a
common decIsion that fully takes into account the mutual interests of the two
organisations.
16 See Ibbo Mandaza, Gilbert Mudenda and Chinyamata Chipeta, Joint Study on Harmonisation,
Rationalisation and Coordination of the Activities of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern
and Southern African States (PTA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
PTA/SADC, July 1994, mimeo.
17 Minutes of the SADC Summit, 29 August 1994, paras. 5.13 and 5.15 on p. 16. The acronym
AEC stands for the continental African Economic Community as envisaged in the Abuja Treaty
of 1991.
18 Final communiqué of the COMESA Summit, 8-9 December 1994, para. 67.
19 Final communiqué of the COMESA Summit, 8-9 December 1994, para. 69.
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The two Summits of the respective organisations in August and December 1994
failed to resolve the conflct as evidenced by the above quotations. Nor has a joint
extraordinary COMESNSADC Summit taken place to date in order to sort things
out. Thus, it would appear that the situation is far from satisfactory. A solution
may emerge if SADC Member States follow up the Summt decision of 29 August
1994 by withdrawing from PTNCOMESA. But it is not reassuring that the same
governments apparently have made self-contradictory decisions in the supreme
decision-making bodies of the two organisations.
Donor pressures have been brought to bear on both parties but the fact that a
workable modus operandi has not been reached as yet does not allay the concerns
of the donor community.
1.3 Towards Community-Building Structures
The desire to prevent the swellng of SADC's bureaucracy to unmanageable 1evels
is fully appreciated. But it is pertinent to ask whether or not this view has evolved
into a bureaucratic leanness axiom to the point of creating bottlenecks in the
organisation which hampers progress with regard to the new agenda. It is the
considered opinion of the present consultants that it has.
Bureaucracy per se is not necessarily inimical to SADC. Bureaucracy is a neutral
term which denotes an administrative machinery for the management of an
organisation towards a specific end. It has come to acquire, however, an odious
connotation because bureaucracies have in actual practice tended to be inefficient,
or so they have been perceived. But there is nothing inherently inefficient about
bureaucracy. A distinetion must be drawn between concept and observable reality.
Even if many bureaucracies have been observed to be inefficient, the way to
counteract such tendencies is not to dispense with bureaucracies altogether. A
certain level of bureaucratisation is necessary - even indispensable - to manage
properly and efficiently the activities and tasks SADC has taken upon itself. But
one should, of course, take measures to ensure that efficiency is maintained at a
high level.
The policy of SADC to keep bureaucracy (Le. number of staff) to a bare minimum
has been implemented too scrupulously. It may be surmised from various
documents that shortage of qualified staff and capacity are factors which seriously
impede progress.20 Inadequate staffing of SCUs in terms of number and quality
appears to be one of the most acute bottlenecks of SADC today. The SCUs appear
20 See e.g. the 1995 Theme Document, SADC: Resources, Institutions and Capacity for
Integration, mimeo, 1994, and the memorandum entitled Management of Regional Cooperation,
prepared by the SADC Secretariat for the Council of Ministers (SADC/CM/94/4.1.3), January
1994.
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to be hampered in their effectiveness by the current institutional and operational
environment which has largely remained unchanged despite the increase in size
and complexity of the tasks.21 ClearIy there is a case for judicious expansion of
the bureaucracy of SADC institutions, inc1uding both the Secretariat and the SCUs.
Whether the current number of staff is excessive or not must be judged against the
magnitude of the tasks at hand.22 There has been no indication in recent years
that ambitions have been dampened. On the contrary, new tasks have been taken
on board. SADC decision-makng organs may shortly be compelled to decide
whether to lower the ambitions of the organisation and slow down the tempo of
progress, or allow an expansion of its bureaucracy to make it commensurate in
size and quality with the tasks ahead. The rationale underIying the bureaucratic
leanness axiom should, therefore, be revisited.
It is recognised that proposing a new institutional structure for SADC is c1early
beyond the terms of reference of this consultancy. But the consultants' task has
been made all that more difficult to undertake due to the state of flux in which
SADC's institutions find themselves pending a definitive resolution to the
institutional problem. To suggest options for a capacity-building fund to strengthen
SADC's structures is putting the cart before the horse as long as it is not known
what those structures are going to be. The logical sequence would rather have
been to decide on the structures first and only then to design a fund to enhance
their capacities.
Given the indeterminate institutional situation the present consultants have been
compelled to eng age in some speculation as to the future framework in order to
create a benchmark from which a capacity-building fund could be constructed,
particularly when it comes to the capital requirement of the fund. It is also deemed
useful to highlight some of SADC' s general problems of an institutional nature
because institutional capacity and functionality are related to the interrelationship
of units in a larger institutional structure, e.g. lines of communication, reporting
and authority.
Debates have been going on for quite some time now on the adequacy of SADC' s
institutional framework. Basically, there are two strands of thought. One is biased
towards a tighter community structure with adequate autonomy and resources to
move ahead on the new and challenging agenda. This implies a greater degree of
supra-nationality, leaving less scope for institutions at the national level. A
corollary in concrete terms would be to upgrade all or some SCUs on a selective
basis to commission status. Moving to such a new status would enable regional
21 Coopers & Lybrand Associates Ltd., SADCC Programme Review and Peiformance Audit. Stage
IV: Audit of Performance of the SADCC Programme of Action, para. 7.3, p. 38.
22 The current staff complement of the SADC Secretariat is about 40, of whom only L O are
professionals.
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recruitment of staff purelyon merit at more competitive remuneration levels; the
terms and conditions of employment as set out in the Protocol to the Treaty on
Immunities and Privileges would apply. Commissions are formally an integral part
of SADC's institutional structure and are answerable to the Council of Ministers.
By contrast the SCUs report to the relevant ministry in the country charged with
that particular sectoral responsibility. Admittedly, SCUs also report to Sectoral
Committees of SADC ministers, but this is a weaker link to SADC than direct
reporting to the Council of Ministers. Moving towards such a structure would
c1arify and rationalise lines of communication and authority, and presumably
enhance the efficiency of the entire organisation. A number of SCUs have argued
in favour of such a move.
The main argument against upgrading SCUs has to do with the cost implications.
For the individual SCU, its staff and the government financing the operationthis
option appears very attractive. All costs would then be covered over SADC's
global budget. Jf, on the other hand, all SCU s were to be upgraded, which is not
unlikely, the contributions to be made by the Member States to balance SADC's
budget would have to be increased substantially. The direct overall costs to each
Member State would probably exceed present leveIs. W ould the Member States
be wiling to accept these cost implications?
The other strand of thought is more cautious and rather favours the status quo -
for two reasons. First, the cost implications of generalising the commssion
structure to all sectors are intolerable given the current state of most economies
in the region. Second, the justification for keeping the SCUs as national entities
in order to secure the active involvement by the members states stil holds; a
commission structure across the board might, on the contrary, have a demobilising
effect on the Member States and potentially have a disruptive impact if arrears
were to accumulate.
Tension between these two strands has plagued the organisation for some time. It
is an exceedingly difficult trade-off to make. Vacilation has resulted. Thus far the
decision-making organs of SADC have been trying to straddle both options,
seeking to strike a balanee between them. Whatever that balance may have been
in the past, it is increasingly being acknowledged that it has not been optimal.
Institutional bottlenecks have developed. There is now a case for reconsideration.
Movement in the direction of more commissions is called for, but not necessarily
transforming all SCUs into commissions at one go. A few sectors could be
selected initially on the basis of criteria of importance in terms of revitalisation of
the economies of the region. Jf so, certain sectors would suggest themselves, e.g.
mining, energy, manufacturing.
An alternative approach would be to rearrange the allocation of sectoral
responsibilities and perhaps combine some sectors the way they are delineated
today. The Treaty refers to seven 'areas of cooperation' rather than sectors, of
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which there are 17 today. SADC would be well advised to take a fresh look at the
way sectors have been delineated and allocated. Drawing on experiences over the
past 15 years the underIying rationale may be seen in a different light now so
many years hence. Jf this were done a streamlined sectoral structure might give
rise to a need for fewer but somewhat more comprehensive commssions.
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2. What is Capacity-Building?
The capacity of an institution can only be measured in terms of its ability to
accomplish its mission in general terms, which may, in turn, be broken down into
a series of composite tasks and assignments. Jf the set objectives are achieved the
institution may be said to have adequate capacity. In other words, it has been
effective in produeing a specific result. However, these statements must be
qualified. First, the desired result may have been achieved at a later date than
originally anticipated, the delay having been caused by capacity problems en route.
Second, the desired output, even if actually brought about, may have resulted from
activities involving exorbitant input costs - financially or otherwise. This means
that efficiency has been low, even if the objectives have somehow been achieved.
ClearIy, this is unsatisfactory. Perhaps the institution in question could have
accomplished an even more ambitious mission by better husbandry of available
resources. The point to underscore here is that capacity or capacity-building must
link effectiveness (i.e. producing a given output per se) to the inputs expended in
the process, i.e. efficiency.
Building capacity is a complex and arduous undertaking, which should be seen in
conjunction with the broader goal of institution-building. Consequently, the time
horizon must be considerable - L O years or more. It has many inter-related
elements. Embarking on capacity-building takes as its point of departure an
acknowledgement that existing capacity is inadequate relative to the task and
workload at hand. Expanding the capacity of an institution can be done in three
ways:
(a) Increasing the total working time available to complete the assignments at
hand, i.e. increasing the staff complement through new recruitment. This is
the option most commonly resorted to because it is straightforward and
apparently an obvious way out, albeit also expensive.
In relation to SADC's current needs this option might involve expansion of
staff at various 1evels and in various units (e.g. Secretariat, Commissions and
SCUs) by increasing the total number of employees or by requiring all staff
to be employed on a full time basis. The same would apply to private sector
associations .
(b) Enhancing the efficiency of existing staff by various means without
increasing the number of staff, i.e. making more economical use of available
resources and deploying staff more rationally. Such steps would involve
rationalising rules, routines, procedures and practices, as well as improving
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management systems. This option is more attractive in terms of cost
effectiveness, but more complex to apply because it presupposes a detailed
assessment of how a reorganisation may produce the desired effect, i.e. how
wastage can be reduced to a minimum.
This option is also more likely to meet with resistance from staff because it
tends to be perceived to increase workload and pressure on existing
personnel. It is also sometimes interpreted by staff - often erroneously so -
to imply a certain measure of distrust, slack discipline and a poor work ethic
on the part of staff. Whereas the latter may be true in some cases, the
inefficient organisation of an institution in the aggregate can generally not
be blamed on the individuals constituting that institution. Hence, seleeting
this option requires careful consultation with staff to allay unfounded fears
in the reorganisation process. Directing attention to positive measures wil
help in that regard. A disinterested bird' s eye is needed to see where there
is scope for improvement.
Such positive steps include improving incentive structures through job
satisfaction and better remuneration, acquisition of efficiency-enhancing
equipment, and staff development through further training to develop new
skils or updating old ones. This would invariably involve financial outlays,
but they should be seen as investments which wil yield returns in terms of
enhanced overall effciency. This course of action would entail, in turn, a
review of existing salary scales, emoluments and fringe benefits with a view
to determining their competitiveness vis-à-vis other institutions in the region
and elsewhere. It would also call for an appraisal of equipment demands and
a review of training needs in terms of substance, level and duration.
Poor remuneration tends to have adverse effects in two ways. First, it may
serve as a source of disgruntlement and undermine staff morale. Second, it
may produce high staff turn over rates and failure to recruit personneI of the
calibre required. What the appropriate level of remuneration should be is
always a matter of judgement and must ultimately be balanced against the
institution's ability to pay. But there is no escaping from the trade-off to be
made.
In terms of institutional continuity and sustainable capacity a competitive
level of remuneration is of paramount importance in retaining the qualified
staff recruited. Although remuneration is not the only retention factor it
certainly ranks very high. But it should be complemented by job satisfaction.
Particular attention should be devoted to the factors militating against staff
turnover lest capacity-building and institution-building evolve into a never-
ending Sisyphus task.
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(c) Combining staff expansion, i.e. option (a), and takng efficiency measures,
i.e. option (b). This would probably be the most effective option and is the
recommended one. However, in combining the two options above, relatively
more weight should be assigned to (b).
Institutions cannot be regarded and developed in isolation from their environment.
Institutions are organisms interacting with their surroundings - affecting external
actors and being affected by external factors. The external environment may be the
larger institutional framework within which smaller institutions operate or of
which they form an integral part. Or, the external environment may be the broader
setting within a given territory. In the case of SADC the external environment of
a SCU may be the totality of SADC's institutional framework, and/or the general
circumstances of the country concerned, e.g. the civil service, the labour market
etc. Pressures are exerted in various ways by these environments on the
institutional units under consideration. The critical factor for SADC's institutions
with respect to capacity-building and their relationship to external milieux is their
abilty to retain high calibre staff and thus secure institutional continuity and
stability. Institutions are made up of people, individuals who are incumbents in an
establishment of positions. The staff are the principal asset of any institution.
Hence, the key to institutional development and capacity-building lies in looking
after, taking care of and nurturing these people.
One should be aware of the fact that e.g. training staff members and providing
them with work experience in a good working environment wil boost their
demand on the labour market, nationally, regionally or internationally. Poaching
of staff may res ult if terms and conditions of employment are not competitive.
This is the dilemma of capacity-building, which reinforces the importanee of
retention mechanisms and incentives.
Admittedly, SADC's loss of valuable staff members would not necessarily mean
that they would be lost to the region. As long as they do not leave the region
altogether it can be argued that other institutions wil be making use of their
qualifications, and contribute in other and indirect ways to the goals of SADC.
Still, from the vantage point of SADC' s institutions it would remain a problem
and hamper progress, particularIy if the phenomenon were widespread and sizable.
In the most general sense enhanced capacity, be it in SADC's institutions or in
private sector associations, should be used, of course, to facilitate and promote
regional integration in Southern Africa. Hitherto, SADC has been preoccupied with
implementation of a wide range of concrete projects under the Programme of
Action as the core activity of regional coordination. Even though the Programme
of Action has by no means been discarded, the organisation has increasingly
moved into a number of additional areas of activity where policy issues are at the
forefront rather than implementation of projects. This means that SADC wil need
to apply much of its capacity to policy analysis in years ahead. Accordingly,
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efforts to build capacity should be geared particularly towards enhancing the
capacity for policy analysis in all sectors.
Effective policy analysis depends on the ability to identify and measure the impact
of various policy options, to assess trade-offs, and to present well thought-out
choices in a well prepared manner to policy-makers and managers. Policy
researchers and analysts need special abilities to analyse and synthesise; to weigh
various alternatives for solving complex problems under conditions of uncertainty,
inadequate data, competing interests, and limited time; to explain persuasively and
clearIy to policy managers the strengths and weaknesses of various options; and
to recommend a specific course of action in keeping with the economic and socio-
political realities of the region. Persuasive policy advice must be founded on
technical competence, but also requires insights into and sensitivity to political and
bureaucratic conditions, creativity and imagination, as well as effective
communicative skils. The counterpart of effective policy formulation based on
sound policy analysis is well managed implementation. But the skils of a manager
differs somewhat from that of a policy analyst. The former needs more than the
latter political sensitivity and skils in public administration, oral and written
communication, task management, personneI selection, time management,
consensus-building and negotiating techniques.23
Il
23 See The African Capacity Building Initiative. Toward Improved Policy Analysis and
Development Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1991.
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3. Towards a Capacity-Building Fund
Notwithstanding the nature of SADC's institutional structure in the future the
organisation wil stil need funds to ensure that it operates efficiently and secures
as much autonomy from donors as possible so as not to be affected unduly by the
agendas of extra-regional forces. Only then can the objective of collective self-
reliance be translated into something more than mere rhetoric. This report is not
primarily addressing SADC's general recurrent co st problem, which is apparently
not serious at present. Nonetheless, it is dealt with, if only by implication, in that
the needs of an improved future institutional structure commensurate with the task
at hand are being addressed. The Capacity-Building Fund is intended to have a
dual function. First, it is designed to enhance institutional capacities for regional
integration by way of a number of interventions and support measures. Second,
once capacities have been expanded, the Fund would - for an initial period -
provide recurrent expenditure support. However, the proposed Capacity-Building
Fund shall principally be geared towards the former function, i.e. building
capacity, rather than providing recurrent revenue to established institutions. In the
latter case the Fund would evolve into a general management fund for the running
of the entire organisation, and possibly obviate the need for annual assessment of
the member states to balanee budgets. To the extent that the Fund would defray
recurrent costs, it should be for a stipulated fixed term only.
3.1 Justification
Large and small funds for various purposes abound, inc1uding that of capacity-
building. What is the justification for establishing yet another one? Could SADC
not continue to tap a variety of other sources for the purpose of building capacity
within its own ranks? Why a separate fund? These questions are highly relevant
and should be answered with seriousness.
While there may be other funds in existence for purposes of institutional capacity-
bu ilding in general, a SADC Fund would be tailor-made for the needs of SADC's
institutions and attendant institutions in the private sector involved in promoting
regional integration. Its overriding goal would be to strengthen institutions to
facilitate regional integration, but its objectives would be specific and much more
carefully defined (see draft constitution of the Fund). This would set it apart from
e.g. the African Capacity-Building Foundation (ACBF), and other major multi-
purpose foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, Pew, Friedrich Ebert, Konrad
Adenauer, Friedrich Naumann, Hanns Seidel, Heinrich Böll etc.
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To the extent that other foundations are available as sources of funding for
capacity-building purposes, SADC would, at the end of the day, be at their mercy.
In effect, the dependency syndrome would thus be perpetuated. Independence, self-
reliance and autonomy may be measured not on ly in terms of the ultimate outcome
of a capacity-building process, but as much in controllng that proeess itself.
Relying on donors or external foundations for financial support would not afford
SADC the necessary autonomy in the very steering of the proeess towards greater
autonomy. The end result might very well be different.
3.2 Capitalisation: Sources
The critical hurdle in establishing a capacity-building fund is likely to be its
capitalisation. The whole feasibility question centres around this challenge. A
range of potential sources has been contemplated, some of which are c1early not
realistie or toa risky, whereas others present themselves as safer bets. A distinction
may be drawn between 'traditional' sources, i.e. contributions by Member States
and donors, and 'non-traditional' sources which in the past have not formed an
important element in the financial base of SADC. The feasibility of capitalising
the proposed Fund hinges on mobilisation of 'non-traditional' sources. Potential
sources inc1ude:
(a) Revenue generated through activities such as football matches, pop concerts,
lotteries, hotel bed lev y etc.;
(b) Voluntary contributions from civil society in Southern Africa;
(c) Voluntary contributions from SADC Mernber States;
(b) Assessed contributions from SADC Member States, either on a flat rate basis
or according to a specified formula of differentiation; .
(d) Voluntary contributions from the donor community, both bilateral and
multilateral agencies;
(e) V oluntary contributions from the private sector in Southern Africa,
principally from individual companies;
(f) Voluntary contributions from the private sector in other parts of the worId,
principally from individual companies;
(g) Temporary lev y on trade transactions within the Southern African Customs
Union for a fixed term or up to a targeted volume.
In order to assess the realism of expectations with respect to the above potential
sources, views have been solicited from a range of institutions and interested
parties in selected Southern African countries, i.e. Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The pattern which emerges is fairIy
uniform throughout the region, with some minor variations.
First, there is strong scepticism, if not a totally dismissive attitude, about the
feasibility of organising events of popular culture (e.g. sporting events and
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concerts) as vehic1es of revenue generation. It would require much work input and
investment up-front, various impresarios would demand a share of the proceeds,
and the risk would be so high that such efforts might instead turn into loss-makng
ventures. This view is shared by the present consultants.
Second, voluntary contributions from civil society in the region, other than the
business community, are highly improbable because most civil society
organisations, i.e. NGOs, are themselves dependent on external funding.
Third, voluntary contributions by member states, over and above the normal
contribution towards SADC's regular budget might be a realistic option. As long
as contributions are voluntary it is likely that some Members States wil not
contribute at all, others wil contribute variable sums according to their economic
strength and commtment to SADC. The extent to which this method of
capitalisation wil be effective, wil also depend on the design of the fund, its
objectives and mode of operation. The accountability question wil no doubt be an
important element in Member States' decisions whether to contribute or not.
Fourth, whether assessed contributions by Member States is a viable option wil
depend on the Council of Ministers and the Summit. In vie w of the fact that some
Member States are currently in arrears with regard to regular contributions to
SADC and the two commssions, there is likely to be reluctance. On the other
hand, if the Member States are serious about removing bottlenecks in the
organisation one would expect a certain wilingness to make contributions towards
that end. Contributions could either be made on a flat rate basis as is the case with
the regular contributions to SADC' s budget, or differentiated according to a
specified formula whereby larger and richer Member States would contribute
comparatively more than the smaller and poorer ones. Admittedly, introducing a
differentiation formula dep arts from the previous practice of paying an equal
amount regardless of parameters of size and GDP. Even so, it would decidedly be
worth considering in light of the new membership structure, ranging from
economically dominant South Africa to tiny Lesotho.
Fifth, voluntary contributions by donors might be realistie, be they bilateral,
multilateral or from foundations of various types. Even if one of the main
purposes of setting up a fund is to reduce donor dependency, in a pragmatie spirit,
it would not hurt that donor contributions account for a certain share as long as
they do not predominate. However, ane should be aware of donor fatigue and the
inclination of donors to scrutinise more carefully than before the projects and
schemes they support.
On principle some donors would be averse or reluctant to contribute capital to an
endowment fund which they do not control as this may be perceived as an
abdication of their privilege as donors to determine the final application of the
funds. Support would be likely to be made conditional on a certain design of the
.
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fund, its management, its objectives and accountability procedures. Provided the
objectives, as specified, are broadly acceptable to donors, they are likely to be
more preoccupied with accountability and management practices. This should not
be a problem to accommodate through the issuance of periodic reports on the
financial position of the Fund and the application of its resources.
Donors may be persuaded by the interim need for a substantial capital contribution
to the Fund occasioned by the transition to a Community. It may not, however, be
possible to persuade them about the need for the perpetuity of the Fund after these
interim objectives have been met. This concern may be overcome by providing in
the constitution of the Fund for the modality of its dissolution.
Sixth, the wilingness of the private sector business community in the region to
contribute appears to be limited. Throughout the region the virtually unanimous
claim emerges that SADC does not have a private sector programme, indeed not
even an agenda. There is only rhetoric about the importanee of the private sector
in engendering economic growth and about the merits of economic liberalisation,
but very little action has been seen. Whatever the validity of such c1aims, the fact
remains that they are being made repeatedly and emphatically, reflecting a
pervasive perception of reality by the private sector. And, whether one likes it or
not, it is that perception which wil be the basis of action and wilingness to
contribute, not an ' objective' assessment of reality , if that can be established at alL.
This underscores SADC' s serious credibility problem vis-à-vis the private sector
and the need to rectify this state of affairs. However, that wil demand meticulous
work and take time. There are indications, however, that the predominantly
negative perception by the business community may be changing. SADC's
recognition of the private sector as the engine of economic growth in the region,
its role in creating an enabling environment through various measures such as
harmonisation of investment codes, organisation of buyer-seller meetings and
promotion of regional markets, is slowly beginning to be appreciated. SADC has
recently started a public relations programme designed to project an image of
SADC as an organisation with a new and expanded mission. It is paricularly
noteworthy that business attitudes appear to be more favourable in SADC's 11th
Member State - South Africa. With the anti-apartheid South Africa stanee long
gone, the business community tend to see a great potential in the region. The
historical legacy of the ' old' SADC may stil be a factor to be reckoned with in
the rest of the region, but not to the same extent in South Africa. Having made
this somewhat more optimistie assessment of future prospects for the private sector
within SADC, it should not be underestimated that the business community wil
only change its views fundamentally when tangible results materialise. Good
intentions are not enough.
In the short term, however, the private sector is not to be entirely written off as
a potential contributor. It is not unlikely that a number of large companies with
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a regional outlook may see their interest furthered by a contribution. Some may
do so to create publicity, much in the same way advertising serves to boost
company image. Others may see tangible benefits accruing to them from the
activities of the Fund. In the latter case contributions may be earmarked for
specific purposes or sectors. For instance, a large mÌning company may want to
contribute to the Fund only if it is reassured that activities are directed towards
strengthening policy work and coordination in the mining sector.
Another rationale for private sector contributions might be activities under the
Fund' s auspices to strengthen business associations of various kinds, be they
chambers of commerce, trade associations, confederations of industry and the like.
In that case the objective of strengthening such associations must be written into
the design of the Fund, in addition to capacity building for the benefit of SADC
structures. To take on board this objective as well would have the added advantage
of building long-term credibility for SADC vis-à-vis the private sector. Again,
private sec tor contributors may want to earmark their contributions to such
activities.
A further inducement vis-à-vis the private sector would be to invite representatives
of that sector onto the Board of Governors of the Fund. This would serve to give
private sector contributors some influence over the operations of the Fund and
reassure them that benefits would, at least in part, accrue to the private sector as
well as public entities of SADC.
Seventh, the same dismissive attitude as is found among private sector
representatives in the region applies to the private sector elsewhere. Regrettably,
SADC has little credibility or goodwil to bank on in this respect. To the extent
N orthern companies take an interest in Southern Africa they are inc1ined to prefer
dealing directly with partners. Likewise, business associations with dealings in
Southern Africa have a preference for bilateral relations with their counterparts in
the region without making a detour via a multilateral mechanism like the proposed
Fund. But again, the private sector of the North should not be dismissed outright.
For the same reasons as those articulated by companies in the region, individual
companies may be wiling to contribute. A practical, down to earth approach is
likely to be insisted upon, perhaps with foci on specific sectors such as mining,
manufacturing, energy or general infrastructure. This might mean earmarking
contributions. AIso, beyond earmarking funds, prospective contributors may wish
to have direct influence through a place on the Board of Governors.
Eighth, the most effective and fastest way to capitalise the Fund to the level
required, would be to impose a small levy on trade transactions within the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). This arrangement would be temporary
and last only until the targeted amount has been reached. The greatest attraetion
of this option is its practicability in that the functioning administrative machinery
for collecting the levy is in place; it could simply be tacked onto the system as it
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operates today. The main reservation that may be encountered is that only a
minority of SADC's Member States would thus capitalise the Fund, whereas all
of them would benefit from its operations. On the other hand, the point may be
made that most members of SACU are among the better off in the region; it would
not be unreasonable to ask them to make an extra contribution. In effect, this
arrangement would entail a form of differentiated assessment of SADC Member
States. In the judgement of the present consultants it would not be feasible to
apply such a levy to all intra-SADC trade, simply because the administrative
machinery for its collection does not exist. Nor would it be feasible to apply the
principle to other forms of taxation, e.g. hotel bed levy, because the tax collection
systems are toa weak to ensure efficiency.
3.3 Capitalisation: V olum e
For the purposes of this report a number of assumptions have been made regarding
the financial demands which wil be expected to be met from the Fund. This has
been done with a view to quantifying the resources which wil be required to be
commtted to the Fund to make it a viable source of financial support. In the
absence of specific information the assumptions made are the following:
l. The annual expenses of the Secretariat are estimated to be US$ 2,400,000;
2. These are expected to grow at a rate of L O per cent compounded each year;
3. The additional expenses which wil be incurred in the administration of an
enhanced Secretariat wil ultimately be equal to the level required to conduct
the present services;
4. That only the additional expenses referred to in the preceding paragraph wil
need to be borne by the Fund and that all these expenses wil be borne by
the Fund;
5. That the Fund is intended to be a full endowment fund which wil seek to
preserve the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the capital base. This
assumption is modified in the numeric models in order to ilustrate the effect
it has on the required magnitude of the Fund;
6. That the expenses to be borne by the Fund wil grow to their full potential
over a number of years. Standard basic assumptions of growth have been
applied in the numeric models in order to ilustrate the effect of a
progressive increase in demand for funds. These assumptions are not based
on any real expectations of expenditure.
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7. That the expenses of administering the Fund wil be a constant L per cent of
the capital. These expenses wil inc1ude those associated with the Governors,
the investment management and the custodian.
8. That the Fund wil be sufficiently capitalised immediately on commencement
and that such additional capital wil be injected at the rate required to meet
the growth of expenses;
9. That the realistic net investment return (after administration expenses) that
can be obtained on the assets of the Fund is a positive return above inflation
of 3 per cent per annum. A basic and standard rate of inflation is assumed
at 3 per cent per annum.
On the basis of these assumptions the total capital base of the Fund on
commencement would ne ed to be at the levels set out below in the context of the
various strategies which may be adopted. The method of determination of these
figures is set out in the numeric models contained in the tab les below. These
models apply the assumptions set out above except where specifically indicated:
a) If the additional expenses of the SADC Secretariat are to be US$500,000 in
year one and only the net return after adjustment for inflation is available for
the funding of these expenses, then the starting capital requirement of the
Fund is US$16,666,667.
b) Jf the additional expenses of the SADC Secretariat are to be US$500,000 in
year one and the gross return (without any adjustment for inflation) is
available for the funding of these expenses, then the starting capital
requirement of the Fund is US$8,333,333.
c) Jf the additional expenses of the SADC secretariat are to be US$500,000 in
year one and the gross return. (without any adjustment for inflation) is
available for the funding of these expenses and half of the total expenses is
funded by applying some of the capital available at the commeneement of
the period, then the starting capital requirement of the Fund is US$4,416,667.
It can be concluded from these relatively basic models that there is a significant
variance in the capital requirement generated by the administrative policy
employed in the management of the Fund. It is recommended that the Fund adopt
a policy which would reduce to a minimum the capital requirement. In the context
of the three possibilties contemplated below the third is clearIy preferable even
though it does not preserve the capital of the Fund and is dependent on constant
regeneration of the Fund's capital from external sources. It has the further
potential advantage of being more attractive to donors which, as has been stated
above, may be reluctant to contribute to an endowment fund over which they have
no effective control.
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3.4 The Legal Framework for the Fund
It is recognised that there is an absolute need for the Fund to be established within
the framework of the Treaty and the existing Protocols to the Treaty. This aspect
was universally endorsed by the respondants interviewed by the present
consultants, and the basis of this requirement is to ensure that the Fund and its
management are accountable solely to SADC and to its constitution. Therefore, the
Treaty and its Protocols have been examined with a view to determining which of
the existing provisions would be helpful in the establishment of a discrete and
effective constitution for the Fund without imposing a requirement for new
legislation in the form of a Protocol or other amendment to the Treaty to be
adopted.
The following provisions of the Treaty and the Protocols thereto confer powers on
SADC which could have a direct bearing on the manner in which the Fund is
established or administered:
(a) Artic1e 9 of the Treatyentitled "Establishment of Institutions"
"1. The following institutions are hereby established:
A. The Summit of Heads of State or Government;
B. The Council of Ministers;
C. Commssions;
D. Standing Commttee of Officials;
E. The Seeretariat; and
F. The TribunaL.
2. Other institutions may be established as necessary"
The Treaty does not specify by what manner such other institutions may be
established. It has been concluded that the only means of achieving the
establishment of an appropriate institution in another form than that which
is already provided for, would be by amendment of Article 9.1 of the Treaty
quoted above.
(b) The Protocol of 17 August 1992 provides in its Artic1e 2 entitled "Funds":
"Without bein g restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of
any kind:
(i) SADC and its institutions, where applicable, may hold funds or
currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency;
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(ii) SADC and its institutions shall be free to transfer their funds or
currency from one country to another or within any country and to
convert any currency held by them into any other currency."
(c) Article 26 of the Treaty, entitled: The Fund provides:
"The Fund of SADC shall consist of contributions of member states, income
from SADC enterprises and receipts from regional and non-regional sources."
The Terms of Reference of this consultancy make it clear that the proposed
Capacity-Building Fund is to be differentiated from the "Fund" defined in
Artic1e 26. It should be considered whether the formulation of Article 26
which provides that the Fund consists of "receipts from regional and non-
regional sources" imposes an obligation on SADC and its Secretariat to
contribute to the Fund all of such receipts. If this interpretation is correct
then Aricle 26 would require amendments in order to enable the
establishment of the Capacity-Building Fund.
(d) Article 25 - Resources
(i) SADC shall be responsible for the mobilisation of its own and
other resources required for the implementation of its programmes
and projects.
(ii) SADC shall create such institutions as may be necessary for the
effective mobilisation and efficient application of resources for
regional development.
(iii) Resources acquired by SADC by way of contributions, loans, grants
or gifts shall be the property of SADC or the resources of SADC
may be made available to member states pursuant to the objectives
of this Treaty under terms and conditions which wil be agreed
between SADC and the members states involved.
(iv) Resources of SADC wil be utilised in the most efficient and
equitable manner.
Again, these provisions would seem to indicate that there is a necessity to
amend the substance of the Treaty in order to accommodate the
establishment of the Capacity-Building Fund and to allow for the conduct of
its management in away which would be c1earIy legislated for. It is
considered to be beyond the scope of the terms of reference to propose
detailed amendments to the Treaty in order to accommodate the
establishment of the Capacity-Building Fund. However, it would seem to be
appropriate that the minimum amendments which may be considered would
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be the inc1usion under the institutions of a new institution, the Capacity-
Building Fund, and the modification of Chapter Nine in order to conform the
Artic1es contained therein with the existence of the Capacity-Building Fund.
Jf the Capacity-Building Fund is to be established as a separate institution,
pursuant to the provisions of Article 20, it could be authorised to establish its own
rules of procedure. This would enable it to adopt a detailed constitution which
would regulate the conduct of its affairs in as detailed a manner as is necessary.
3.5 Mode of Establishing the Fund
A review of the legal provisions outlined above invites the conc1usion that in order
to establish the new institution pursuant to the provisions of Article 9(2), it is
necessary to adopt a Protocol to that effect.24 This conclusion is arrived at by
accepting that the lack of directions for the establishment of new institutions was
intentional in order to reserve that function to the supreme authority of the
Member States.25.
It is considered to be beyond the terms of reference of this consultancy to propose
a detailed draft Protocol establishing the Fund. However, in order to ilustrate the
proposal a discussion draft is appended as Appendix 3.
In order to maintain adequate flexibility in the conduct of the affairs of the Fund
as these may evolve, it is suggested that the Protocol establishing the Fund should
not embody the constitution of the Fund. Rather, it is recommended that the
Protocol authorise the Council of Ministers to adopt the detailed constitution and
that once adopted, that it be amendable only by the CounciL.
3.6 Mode of Operation
3.6.1 Foreign Exchange or Investment Restrictions
SADC is able to manage its assets in a manner which is entirely free from any
restrictions on foreign exchange. Accordingly, SADC may hold its assets in any
24 Article 22(1) of the Treaty authorises the adoption of Protocols "as may be necessary in each
area of cooperation". While the Fund is recognised not to be an area of cooperation, it is
thought that the provisions of this article are capable of being interpreted to allow a Protocol
establishing the Fund.
25 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) sets out some general rules
of interpretation of international conventions. None of the Member States of SADC are
signatories to this Convention. Nevertheless, it is generally regarded as containing useful
exposition of the general principles applicable to the interpretation of Treaties. This conclusion
is supported by the application of these interpretation rules.
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currency.26 Neither the Treaty nor the Protocol impose any restrictions on the
manner in which the assets of SADC may be invested.
3.6.2 Taxation
SADC is exempt from all taxes including taxes on investment income arising in
any of the Member States.27 This tax exempt status may disqualify SADC from
benefitting from existing Double Tax Treaty exemptions for which it might
otherwise have qualified.28 Jf there is any likelihood that the Fund would benefit
from withholding tax reductions on income from investments, then it may be
appropriate to situate the registered office of the Fund in that member state which
has the most favourable treaty arrangements in relation to the proposed
investments.
3.6.3 Existing Powers of the Executive Secretary in Financial Matters
The following provisions of the Treaty confer powers on the Executive Secretar
which could have a direct bearing on the manner in which the Fund is established
or administered:
(a) Pursuant to the direction of the Council or Summit or on his own initiative
to undertake measures aimed at promoting the objectives of SADC and
enhancing its performance (Artic1e 15(1)(b));
(b) To act as custodian of the assets of SADC (Article 15(1)(e));
(c) To attend to the administration and finances of the Secretariat (Article
15(1)(g));
(d) To prep are the Budget and Audited Accounts of SADC for submission to the
Council (Article 15(1)(i));
(e) To cause to be prepared and audited annual statements of accounts for the
Secretariat and Commissions (Artic1e 29(2));29
26 Article 2 of the Protocol of August 1992.
27 Article 3 of the Protocol of August 1992.
28 It is uncertain whether an inter-governmental body like SADC could qualify for treaty relief
under any of the treaties of any one of the Member States even if the investment activity were
to be conducted from within that Member State.
29 It is assumed that this obligation extends to the accounts of other institutions of SADC.
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(f) To prepare and submit to the Council for approval financial regulations,
standing orders and rules for the management of the affairs of SADC
(Artic1e 30).
3.7 Structural Considerations
The considerations which are outlne d below are regarded by the present
consultants to represent essential components of an adequately regulated
investment management structure. For the purposes of this analysis it has been
assumed that the appropriate amendments to the Treaty (through the adoption of
a Protoeol) would be achievable in order to ensure the constitutional accountability
of the management of the Fund as well as to afford the Fund the full benefit of
being a SADC institution, not least of which would be the tax ädvantages.
3.7.1 Legal Form
If the Treaty can be amended so as to provide for the Capacity-Building Fund to
have the status of an Institution under the Treaty, then the Treaty wil define the
legal form of the Fund. It is proposed that the Capacity-Building Fund in the form
of an Institution should adopt a detailed constitution on its inception which would
set out the specific provisions relating to its management structure, investment
restrictions, accounting treatment for assets and disbursement procedures. (See
chapter 3.8 below for an outline proposal of such a constitution).
3.7.2 Management Structure
(a) It is proposed that the Fund be managed by a Board of Governors which
would comprise up to ten members. Although it is conceivable that the
Executive Secretary of SADC would, ex officio, be a member of the Board
of Governors, it is recommended that the Board of Governors should consist
of members drawn from outside the SADC Executive. It is essential that the
members of the Board of Governors have sufficient financial acumen and
stature in the financial community to ensure that the Fund would be run in
accordance with its constitution. It is recommended that the candidates for
appointment as Governors of the Fund be drawn from the Central Banks in
the region as well as the international private sector financial community.
(b) The Board of Governors wil play a role which is essentially supervisory and
would be expected to meet on a quarterly basis to review reports prepared
in accordance with its Constitution by the investment manager.
(c) It is proposed further that the Fund be managed by an independent financial
institution selected by the Board of Governors pursuant to atender
procedure. This institution wil be selected on the basis of its financial
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acumen and stature in the international investment community. The
institution so selected would enter into an investment Management
Agreement with the Fund pursuant to which its services and remuneration
would be specified in detaiL. The specified services would inc1ude all
required accounting services and reporting facilities. It should be expected
that the cost of such a service would be between 0.5 and 1.0 per cent per
annum of the total net value of assets at the beginning of the year.
(d) It is recommended that the Fund appoint a second financial institution as the
custodian of the assets. This recommendation extends to sugge sting that only
those financial institutions which have a AAA rating by at least one of
Moodys or Standard & Poors be considered as candidates for the custodian
function.
(e) The investment manager would be required to invest the assets of the Fund
in accordance with the restrictions imposed in the Constitution and with a
view to achieving the investment objectives set out therein. The investment
manager would, furthermore, make quarterIy presentations to the Board of
Governors and would support these presentations by detailed financial reports
which would be made available to the SADC Executive as well as to the
Members States.
(f) All disbursements from the Fund wil be made on a quarterIy basis pursuant
to requisitions prepared by the Secretariat and approved by the Board of
Governors.
(g) It is not proposed that the Fund should have any employee or that the
Secretariat should fulfi any functions in relation to the administration of its
assets or of its accounting. The role of the Secretariat would be limited to
requisitioning payments from the Fund on a quarterIy basis as described
above.
3.7.3 Investment Objectives
It is proposed that the investment objectives of the Fund be formulated in such a
manner as would limit the risk to which the assets are put. In practice, this would
mean that the anticipated return to be earned on the Fund would not be
spectacular. In the light of the conservative nature of the proposed investment
strategy and the assumption that the Fund is to be constituted as a permanent
endowment fund which wil retain its value in real (inflation adj u sted) terms it is
proposed that the Fund pursue a relative ly modest investment objective which is
formulated in terms of the real return over US dollar inflation. Just what can be
expected by way of real return would have to be determined in conjunction with
the investment manager in due course.
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3.7.4 Investment Restrictions
The constitution of the Fund should establish detailed investment restrictions
which would limit the risk to which the assets of the Fund would be exposed. A
range of appropriate investment restrictions are contained in the draft constitution
in chapter 3.8 below.
3.7.5 Accounting Procedures and Independent Review
The constitution should provide for a detailed accounting treatment of the assets
of the Fund and specify the nature of the reports which are required to be
presented to the supervisory Board of Governors. It is essential that the Fund
should be subject to audit by independent auditors, and in this regard it is
recommended that the auditors be different to those which audit the accounts of
SADC.
3.8 A Draft Constitution for the Fund
Article l: Definitions
l. In this Constitution the following words and expressions shall, where not
inconsistent with the context, have the following meanings:
1.1 "the Board" means the Board of Governors of the Fund;
1.2 "the Capacity-Building Fund" or "the Fund" means the Capacity-Building
Fund established pursuant to a Protocol to the Treaty establishing the
Southern African Development Community.
1.3 "the Council" means Council of Ministers of SADC established by Artic1e
9 of the Treaty.
1.4 "Registered Office" means the registered office of the Fund established
pursuant to the provisions of Artic1e 5.
1.5 "Register of Shareholders" means the register maintained pursuant to the
provisions of Article 8.
1.6 "The Treaty" means the Treaty of the Southern African Development
Community.
1.7 "Valuation Date" means those dates on which valuations are done pursuant
to Article 25.
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Article 2: The Fund
2. There exists pursuant to the Treaty an institution named "The Capacity-
Building Fund".
Article 3: Duration
3. The Fund is established for an indefinite duration.
Article 4: Exclusive Object
4. The exclusive object of the Fund is to place the monies available to it in one
or more portfolios of securities of all types with the purpose of spreading
investment risk
The Fund may take any measures and carry out any operation which it may deem
useful in the accomplishment and development of its purpose to the full extent
permitted by the Treaty.
Article 5: Registered Office
5. The Registered Office of the Fund is established in Gaborone, Botswana.
Branches or other offces may be established abroad by resolution of the Board.
In the event that the Board determines that extraordinary political, economic or
social developments have occurred, or are imminent, that would interfere with the
normal activities of the Fund at its Registered Office, or with the ease of
communication between such office and persons abroad, the Registered Office
may be temporarily transferred abroad until the complete cessation of these
abnormal circumstances.
Article 6: Funds
6. The Board shall establish a portfolio comprising the assets of the Fund.
Article 7: Powers of the Council
7. Any regularly constituted meeting of the Council shall be empowered to
adopt resolutions in relation to any aspect of the Management of the Fund or the
conduct of its business. This should not be construed to mean that the Council
would have any responsibilty for the day-to-day management of the Capacity-
Building Fund, which rests entirely with its Board of Governors.
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Article 8: Board of Governors
8. The Fund shall be managed by a Board of Governors composed of not less
than six members.
Each Governor shall be elected by the Council for a period of five years, provided,
however, that a Governor may be removed with or without cause and/or replaced
at any time by resolution adopted by the CounciL.
N o more than one Governor shall be an employee or officer of the Secretariat.
In the event that there should be a vacancy in the office of Governor the
remaining Governors may meet and may elect, by majority vote, a Governor
whose term of office shall expire at the next meeting of the CounciL.
Article 9: Proceedings of the Board
9. The chairman and one or more vice-chairmen of the Board shall be appointed
by the Council of Ministers. The Board must choose a seeretary, who need not be
a Governor and who shall be responsible for keeping the minutes of the meetings
of the Board. Meetings of the Board may be convened by the chairman and must
be convened upon the request of any two Governors. The Board shall meet at the
Registered Office or such other place as may be indicated in the notice of meeting.
The chairman shall preside at all meetings of the Board, but in his absence the
Board may appoint any director as chairman pro tempore by vote of the majority
of the Governors present at any such meeting.
Written notice of any meeting of the Board shall be given to all Governors at least
twenty-one days in advance of the date set for such meeting, except in
circumstances of emergency, in which case the nature of such circumstances shall
be set forth in the notice of meeting. This notice may be waived by the consent
of each director given in writing or by cable or telegram or telex or facsimile
message. Separate notice shall not be required for individual meetings held at
times and places prescribed in a schedule previously adopted by resolution of the
Board.
Any Governor may act at any meeting of the Board by appointing in writing or
by cable or telegram or telex or facsimile message another Governor as his proxy.
In case of urgency Governors may also cast their vote in writing or by cable,
facsimile message, telegram or telex and may participate in meetings and vote
thereat by means of conference telephone.
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The Governors may only act at duly convened meetings of the Board. Governors
may not bind the Fund by their individual acts, except as specifically permitted by
resolution of the Board or by this Constitution.
The Board can deliberate or act validly only if at least two-thirds of the Governors
are present or represented at a meeting of the Board. Decisions shall be taken by
a simple majority of the votes of the Governors present or represented at such
meeting. In the event that in any meeting the number of votes for and against a
resolution shall be equal, the chairman of the meeting shall have a casting vote.
Resolutions of the Board may also be passed in the form of one or several
dec1arations in writing signe d by all the Governors.
The Board may delegate its powers to conduct the daily management and affairs
of the Fund and its powers to carry out acts in furtherance of the policy and
purpose, to natural persons or corporate entities which need not be members of the
Board.
Article 10: Minutes of Board Meetings
10. The minutes of any meeting of the Board shall be signed by the chairman for
the time bein g who presided at such meeting.
Copies or extracts of such minutes which may be produced in judicial proceedings
or otherwise shall be signed by such chairman, or by the seeretary, or by two
Governors.
Article 11: Remuneration of Governors
11. The Council may from time to time determine and allot to the Governors
remuneration in the form of fixed emoluments. The Governors may also be paid
all travelling, hotel and other expenses properIy incurred by them in attending and
returning from meetings of the Board or any commttee of the Board or in
connection with the business of the Fund.
Article 12: Determination of Investment Policies
12. The Board shall have the power to do all things on behalf of the Fund which
are not expressly reserved to the shareholders in general meeting by this
Constitution and shall, without limiting the generality of the aforegoing, have
power to determine the corporate and investment policy for the investments of the
Fund based upon the principle of spreading of risks, subject to such investment
restrictions as may be imposed by the Treaty or regulation or as may be
determined by the Board.
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In the determination and implementation of the investment policy the Board may
cause 35 per cent or more of the assets of the Fund to be invested in transferable
securities issued or guaranteed by any Member State of SADC, any member of the
OECD or any public international body of which at least one Member State of
SADC is a member.
Article 13: Investment Restrictions
13. The Fund may invest only in:
13.1 transferable securities admitted to official listing on a stock exchange in an
Eligible State, and/or
13.2 transferable securities dealt in on any other Regulated Market in an OECD
member state, and/or
13.3 recently issued transferable securities, provided that the terms of issue
inc1ude an undertakng that application wil be made for admission to an
offciallisting on an Eligible Market and such admission is achieved within
a year of the issue, (all such securities under (i), (ii) and (iii) above being
hereby defined as "Eligible Transferable Securities"); EXCEPT THAT the
Fund may also invest in transferable securities other than Eligible
Transferable Securities or in debt instruments such as money market
instruments which are trade d regularIy and have a remaining maturity
exceeding 12 months (which are treated because of their characteristics as
equivalent to transferable securities and which are inter alia, transferable,
liquid and have a value which can be accurately determined on each Weekly
Dealing Day).
13.4 The Fund shall invest no more than 10 per cent of the net assets of any Fund
in transferable securities issued by the same issuing body.
(a) The limit of 10 per cent laid down in sub-paragraph 13.4 above wil be
increased to a maximum of 35 per cent in respect of transferable
securities which are issued or guaranteed by a member of the European
Union, by its local authorities, by another Eligible State or by public
international bodies of which one or more EU member states are
members. The limit of L O per cent set forth hereinabove may be of a
maximum of 25 per cent for certain debt securities if they are issued by
a credit institution whose registered office is situated in an EU Member
State and which is subject, by virtue of law, to particular public
supervision for the purpose of protecting the holders of such debt
securities, in paricular, the amounts resulting from the issue of such
debt securities must be invested pursuant to the law in assets, which
sufficiently cover, the liabilties arising therefrom and which are
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assigned to the preferential repayment of capital and accrued interest in
the case of default by the issuer. If Fund invests more that 5 per cent of
its assets in such debt securities as referred to in this paragraph and
issued by the same issuer, the total value of such investments may not
exceed 80 per cent of the value of Funds assets.
13.5 The Fund shall not:
(a) Own more than 10 per cent of the outstanding securities of any dass of
any one issuer; or
(b) Acquire shares carring voting rights which would enable the Fund to
take legal or management control or to exercise significant influence
over the management of the issuing body; or
(c) Acquire more than 20 per cent of the shares of another collective
investment undertaking; or
(d) Make investments in, or enter into transactions involving precious
metals, or certificates representing such precious metals; or
(e) Pure hase or sell real estate or any option, right or interest therein, except
that the Fund may invest in securities secured by real estate or interests
therein or issued by companies which invest in real estate or interests
therein; or
(f) Purehase any securities on margin (except that the Fund may obtain such
short-term credit as may be necessary for the c1earance of purehases and
sales of securities) or make short sa1es of securities or maintain a short
position; or
(g) Make loans to or act as a guarantor for, other persons, or assume,
endorse or otherwise become directly or contingently liable for, or in
connection with, any obligation or indebtedness of any person in respect
of borrowed monies, provided that for the purpose of this restriction the
acquisition of Eligible Transferable Securities in partly paid form shall
not be deemed to constitute the making of a loan or be prohibited by
this c1ause.
Article 14: Governors' Interests
14. No contract or other trans action shall be entered into between the Fund and
any other company or firm in which one or more of the Governors or officers of
the Fund is interested in, or is a director, associate, officer or employee.
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Article 15: Auditor
15. The accounting information given in the annual report must be audited by an
independent auditor, chartered in one of the member states of SADC, who shall
not be an auditor otherwise engaged by SADC. The auditor is appointed by the
Board.
The report must at least state that the accounting information given in the annual
report gives a true and fair view.
The auditor shall conduct the audit in the manner required by the Treaty and
generally accepted accounting practice in Botswana.
The auditor shall be remunerated by the Fund.
Article 16: Indemnity
16. The Fund may indemnify any Governor or officer, and his heirs, executors
and administrators, against expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection
with any action, suit or proceeding to which he may be made a party by reason
of his being or having been a Governor or officer of the Fund or, at its request,
of any other company of which the Fund is a shareholder or creditor and from
which he is not entitled to be indemnified. Such person shall be so indemnified
in all circumstances except in relation to matters on which he shall be finally
adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for gross negligence or
misconduct; in the event of a settlement, indemnification shall be provided only
in connection with such matters covered by the settlement on which the Fund is
advised by counsel that the person to be indemnified did not commit such a breach
of duty. The foregoing right of indemnification shall not exclude other rights to
which he may be entitled.
Article 17: Administration
17. The Fund wil be bound by the joint signature of any two Governors.
Article 18: Determination of Net Asset Value
18. The Net Asset Value of shares of each class of shares in the Fund shall be
expressed in United States dollars and shall be determined in respect of any
Valuation Date.
If after any valuation has been made the Board is of the view that events have
occurred which materially affect such valuation, the Board may cancel the affected
valuation and carry out another.
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The valuation of the Net Asset Value of each Fund shall be made in the following
manner:
18.1 The assets of the Fund shall be deemed to inc1ude those assets listed below:
(a) all cash in hand or on deposit or receivable, inc1uding any interest
accrued thereon;
(b) all bils and demand notes and accounts receivable (inc1uding proceeds
of securities sold but not delivered), except those receivable from a
subsidiary of the Fund;
(c) all bonds, time notes, shares, stock, debenture stocks, subscription rights,
warrants, options and other investments and securities owned or
contracted for by the Fund;
(d) all stock, stock dividends, cash dividends and cash distributions
receivable by the Fund to the extent information thereon is reasonably
available to the Fund (provided that the Fund may make adjustments
with regard to fluctuations in the market value of securities caused by
trading ex-dividends, ex-rights, or by similar practices);
(e) all interest accrued on any interest-bearing securities owned by the Fund
except to the extent that the same is included or reflected in the
principal amount of such security; and
(f) all other assets of every kind and nature, inc1uding prepaid expenses.
18.2 The liabilities of each Fund corresponding to different c1asses of shares of
the Fund shall be deemed to include that proportion of each of the items
listed below as is attributable to that particular Fund:
(a) allloans, bils and accounts payable;
(b) all accrued or payable administrative expenses (inc1uding investment
advisory fee, custodian fee, corporate agents' fees, administration fee
and renewal commissions);
(c) all known liabilities, present and future, including all matured
contractual obligations for payments of money or property, including the
amount of any unpaid dividends dec1ared by the Fund where the
Valuation Date falls on the record date for determination of the person
entitled thereto or is subsequent thereto;
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(d) an appropriate provision for future taxes as determined from time to
time by the Board, and other reserves, if any, authorised and approved
by the Board; and
(e) all other liabilities of the Fund of whatsoever kind and nature. In
determining the amount of such liabilities the Fund may calculate
administrative and other expenses of a regular or recurring nature on an
estimated figure for yearIy or other periods in advance, and may accrue
the same in equal proportions over any such period.
18.3 For the purposes of this Artic1e:
(a) Except in the circumstances contemplated in (e) below the value of the
assets of the Fund shall be determined as follows:
(i) The value of any cash in hand or on deposit, bils and demand
notes and accounts receivable, prepaid expenses, cash dividends and
interest declared or accrued as aforesaid and not yet received shall
be deemed to be the full amount thereof, unless in any case the
same is unlikely to be paid or received in full, in which case the
value thereof shall be arrived at after making such discount as the
Board may consider appropriate in such case to reflect the true
value thereof;
(ii) The value of securities which are quoted or dealt in on any stock
exchange wil be based on the quoted middle market price as at 9
a.m. on the relevant Valuation Date or the previous c10sing middle
market price if applicable;
(iii) The value of securities dealt in on other organised markets wil be
based on the last available middle market price applicable to the
relevant Valuation Date;
(iv) The value of securities which are not quoted or dealt in on any
stock exchange or other organised market as determined by the
Board or its authorised agent, wil be based on the reasonably
foreseeable sales price determined prudently and in good faith;
(v) In circumstances where the Board is of the view that the value of
any securities quoted or dealt in on any stock exchange or dealt in
on any other organised market as determined in (ii) and (iii) above
is not a fair reflection of the value of such assets the Board may by
other means determine the value thereof.
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(b) All investments, cash balances and other assets of the Fund expressed
in currencies other than the United States dollar shall be valued after
taking into account the market rate or rates of exchange in force on the
Valuation Date.
Article 19: Custodian
19. The Board shall appoint a Custodian which shall be a bank having a credit
rating awarded by an internationally recognised credit rating agency of at
least AAA or its equivalent. The Custodian shall:-
19.1 hold the assets of the Fund either directly or through the agency of a
sub-custodian and in whose name or in the name of which sub-custodian the
same shall be registered in the case of registered securities and who shall
ensure that Investments made and expenses incurred in pursuance of this
Constitution are made and incurred in accordance therewith and shall
perform such other duties upon such terms as may be provided for in this
Constitution or as the Board may from time to time (with the agreement of
the Custodian) determine. All moneys, bils and notes belonging to the Fund
shall be paid to or to the order of or deposited with or to the order of the
Custodian to an account to be opened in the name of the Fund. In the event
of the Custodian desiring to retire, the Board shall use their best endeavours
to fin d a corporation having the said qualifications to act as Custodian and
upon doing so the Board shall appoint such corporation to be Custodian in
place of the retiring Custodian. The Board shall not remove the Custodian
unless and until a successor corporation shall have been appointed in
accordance with this Article to act in the place thereof. The powers of the
Board under this Article shall include a power to appoint joint custodians
and/or sub-custodians; and
19.2 The Custodian shall be entitled at any time at its entire discretion and
without assigning any reason to give notice to the Manager that it is not
prepared to accept any property which in the opinion of the Custodian
infringes the terms of this Constitution and the Custodian shall be entitled
to require the Manager to replace any such property with other property not
infringing the terms of this Constitution.
Article 20: Valuations
20. The Net Asset Value of the Fund shall be determined by the Fund from time
to time, but in no instance less than once each calendar quarter, as the Board by
regulation may direct.
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Article 21: Withdrawals from the Fund
21. The Board of Governors may authorise the withdrawal of capital and income
from the Fund up on written request made by the Executive Secretary of SADC.
The Board shall satisfy itself that any such request for withdrawal is properIy
made in the pursuit of the objective of the Fund as determined by the Protocol
establishing the Fund.
Article 22: FinancIal Year
22. The accounting year of the Fund shall begin on the first day of April in each
year and shall terminate on the thirty-first day of March in the following year. The
accounts of the Fund shall be expressed in (United States dollars). Where there are
different dasses of shares each dass representing a Fund, and if the accounts
within such Funds are expressed in different currencies, such accounts shall be
converted into (United States dollars) at the relevant middle market exchange rate
at the dose of business on the last day of the financial year and added together
for the purpose of the determination of the accounts of the Fund.
Article 23: Distribution upon Liquidation
23. In the event of a dissolution of the Fund liquidation shall be carried out by
one or severalliquidators (w ho may be natural persons or legal entities) named by
the Council who shall determine their powers and their compensation.
The assets available for distribution shall be distributed to the Member States in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Article 24: Amendment
24. This Constitution may be amended from time to time by a resolution of the
Council on the advice of the Board.
Article 25: General
25. All matters not governed by this Constitution shall be determined In
accordance with the Treaty.
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3.9 Tentative Timetable for Establishing the Fund
Activity Date
Acceptance of final report by Secretariat June 1995
Preparation of draft Protocol to Treaty and draft June 1995
Constitution of Fund
Review of report by Council of Ministers August 1995
Finalisation of strategy for capitalisation September
1995
Adoption of Protocol establishing the Fund November
1995
Appointment of Board of Governors November
1995
Appointment of Custodian November
1995
Commeneement of fund-raising programme January 1996
Commeneement of tender process for selection of January 1996
investment manager
Conc1ude contract with Investment Manager and detailed March 1996
account opening and operation procedures established
Fund-raising completed
Capacity-Building Fund is operational
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Appendix 2
Terms of Reference
1. Background
1.1 One of the founding objectives of SADC the "Conference", was to "mobilise
resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional
policies". In this respect, a SADCC Development Fund was enunciated as a
possible regional mechanism for resource mobilisation. However, a quick
review of SADCC's short history of almost 14 years clearly shows that
resource mobilsation has been one of the weakest points of the
organisation's attempt at regional economic cooperation. Hence, the
Organisation remains heavily dependent on external funding and technical
assistance for the implementation of its sectoral programmes and projects.
Fortunately for SADC the International Cooperating Partners have largely
been forthcoming in this regard.
1.2 With the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Cold War, there has
been a notable decline in Offcial Development Assistance (ODA) to
developing countries in general, and Africa in particular. Apart from donor
fatigue, this has largely been due to increased competition for resources from
the developed West among the developing countries and the former Eastern
bloc. So far, Russia and the East European countries seem to attract greater
worId attention and resources than Africa and other developing countries. It
is time, therefore, that SADC thought seriously about mobilising resources
internally for the implementation of its regional programmes and projects.
This is, but, only one aspect of the problem.
1.3 At the launching of the Southern African Development Community during
the Consultative Conference in Harare, in January 1993, Council affirmed
that it would be necessar for the Organisation to evolve approaches which
would ensure, inter alia that a framework and mechanisms are established
for the mobilisation of resources, particularIy non-public resources, both
human and tïnancial, to sustain the integration process. To this end, the
approved theme for the 1995 Consultative Conference is SADC: Resource,
Institution and Capacity for Integration.
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2. The Issues
2.1 The transformation of SADCC the "Conference" into SADC, the
"Community" in August 1992 requires the Organisation to substantially
strengthen its organisation and management systems. However, this goal
cannot be attained in the short and medium term without, first of all, having
to strengthen the institutional capacity of SADC to man age its affairs
effectively and in the most efficient manner. In other words, SADC must
develop the capacity to become an effcient and successful regional
Organisation. To this end, there is a need to evolve mechanisms and
institutions capable of mobilising and directing resources into priority areas
of regional cooperation and integration.
2.2 Since 1980 when SADCC was founded, member States' political
commitment to mobilsing regional resources to sustain their common
institutions, namely, the Secretariat, the Southern African Centre for
Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) and the South African
Transport and communications Commssion (SATCC) has never been
doubted. Currently, member States make their contributions in two main
ways, namely:
(i) direct annual contributions to the three common institutions; and
(ii) direct financial and human support to the Sector Coordinating Units
2.3 With regard to direct annual contributions, available statistics indicate that
the total annual budget for the three common institutions has risen from a
figure of about US$ 1.2 millon to approximately US$ 11.9 millon within
the last five years, that is, an increase of nearIy ten times. To date, member
States contributions have been regular and no major difficulties have been
experienced.
2.4 In addition to making direct contributions, member States support SADC' s
overheads by paying for their public officers and Ministers who attend
SADC meetings. This form of support is also extended to the work of
National and Sectoral Contact Points in the respective countries. Thus, when
taken together, the amount of resources spent by member States on SADC
activities and programmes can be quite significant.
2.5 However, much of the support rendered by member States, be it financial or
human, is not easily quantifiable, as little systematie information is kept
concerning expenditures on Sector Coordinating Units and other SADC-
related activities. Consequently, it is rather difficult to determine the level of
resources directed towards SADC programmes by member States. This is,
therefore, one area where improvements are undoubtedly required in order
to enhance the flow of information.
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2.6 With the ratification of the Treaty establishing the Southern African
Development Community in September, 1993 there is need to set up strong
and self-sustaining Community institutions to implement the new and
complex regional integration agenda of SADC. In this regard, Council has
mandated the Secretariat to explore ways and means of mobilising resources
for SADC institutions, in order to strengthen their capacity to operate more
effectively and efficiently.
2.7 One way this could be achieved would be to establish a Capacity-Building
Fund. The Fund would be a permanent institutional structure to be used
primarily to mobilise resources for institutional capacity building. This would
enable SADC, as a regional institution in its own right, to make financial
contributions to all SADC organs and functionaries, without necessarily
having to depend solelyon member States' contributions. In this way, the
Fund would serve as a more stable and reliable source of financing for
SADC' s institutions, unlike the case at the moment.
2.8 Possible sources of capitalising the Fund could be from the civil society (e.g.
individual contributions or taxed income), the governments, public
corporations and the private sector. Initially, SADC could launch a public
appeal to interest potential contributors, nationally, regionally, and
internationally. All contributions would go to a common pool, the Capacity-
Building Fund. Par of the resources so mobilised would be invested or
placed in high-yielding interest bank accounts. A current account would also
be maintained to support the operational and/or administrative costs of
SADC institutions in accordance with approved Council regulations and
procedures.
2.9 It is important to distinguish between the proposed Capacity-Building Fund
and the SADC Fund stipulated in Article 26 of the Treaty. As discussed
above, the former wil serve as a special Fund for capacity building and
strengthening of SADC institutions and meeting operational costs. The
SADC Fund on the other hand, wil be a form of a Development Fund to
which member States, SADC enterprises and International Cooperating
Partners wil be requested to contribute to support programme and project
implementation.
3. Objective
3.1 The main objective of the consultancy would be to undertake a study to
determine the feasibility and viabilty of the proposed SADC Capacity-
Building Fund. The consultants would be required to undertake, inter alia,
the following tasks.
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(a) Define the concept of a Capacity-Building Fund in concrete terms.
(b) Determine the mechanisms and modalities for the operationalisation
of the proposed Capacity-Building Fund.
(c) Identify the various potential sources of finance for capitalising the
Fund, and propose ways and means for effective mobilisation of such
resources.
(d) Propose an appropriate organisation and structure of the proposed
Capacity-Building Fund. This should inc1ude, inter alia, the Fund's
objectives, organisations, management, staffing, and the necessary
legal instruments and provisions.
(e) Propose strategies that wil ensure successful establishment, effective
operation and future sustainability of the Fund.
(f) Draw up a realistic time-frame for establishing the Fund.
.
4. Study Team
4.1 This study team wil consist of two experts, one of whom wil be hired
from within the region. A Masters Degree in Financial Management or
equivalent is the required minimum qualifications. In addition, the
candidates wil be expected to have vast experience in resource
mobilisation and/or fund management.
4.2 The experts wil be required to work in c10se consultation with the SADC
Secretariat.
5. Workplan
5.1 The duration of the study is estimated to take approximately 6 weeks or 42
days, distributed as follows:
Briefing meeting at Secretariat
Consultations with relevant regional institutions
(4 days x 5 countries)
Report writing
Discussion of Draft Report at Secretariat
Final Report
Total
2 days
21 days
12 days
2 days
5 days
42 days
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Appendix 3
Draft Protocol Establishing the Capacity-Building Fund
PROTOCOL
TO
THE TREATY
ESTABLISHING
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
ON
THE CAPACITY-BUILDING FUND
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PREAMBLE
The Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development
Community (hereinafter referred to as SADC), signatories to the Treaty
establishing SADC (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty);
CONSIDERING Artic1e 9(2) of the Treaty which provides that SADC may
establish such additional Institutions as are necessary, and Artic1e 25 of the Treaty
relevant to the mobilsation of resources and the creation of Institutions to this
effect;
HA VE AGREED as follows:
ARTICLE 1
THE CAPACITY-BUILDING FUND
An additional Institution to be called the Capacity-Building Fund is hereby
established.
ARTICLE 2
OBJECTIVE
L. The objective of the Capacity-Building Fund is to mobilise resources in
order to build the capacity of SADC and to co-ordinate the management
of such resources.
2. Both the capital and the income earned on the capital may be applied
towards meeting the objective of the Capacity-Building Fund.
3. The capital of the Capacity-Building Fund shall be made up out of
contributions from Member States and such other sources as the
management of the Capacity-Building Fund the Secretariat are able to
mobilise.
4. Property acquired by or in the name of the Capacity-Building Fund shall
be managed in accordance with its constitution and shall remain distinet
from the other assets of SADC.
5. The authority of the Executive Secretary to act as the custodian of the
assets of SADC shall not apply to the assets of the Capacity-Building
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Fund, which shall appoint an independent custodian which shall be a Bank
having such minimum credit rating as the Council may determine.
ARTICLE 3
CONSTITUTION
The constitution of the Capacity-Building Fund shall be drawn up by the Council
and it shall determine the powers, functions, procedures and other matters related
to the operations of the Capacity-Building Fund. The constitution of the Capacity-
Building Fund, once adopted by the Council, may only be amended by the
CounciL.
ARTICLE 4
MANAGEMENT
The Capacity-Building Fund shall be managed by a Board of Governors consisting
of ten Governors who shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers and who
shall hold office at the pleasure of the CounciL.
ARTICLE 5
AMENDMENTS
l. An amendment to this Protocol shall be adopted by a decision of three-
quarters of all the members of the Summit.
2. A proposal for the amendment of this Protocol may be made to the
Executive Secretary by any Member State for preliminary consideration by
the Council, provided, however, that the proposed amendment shall not be
submitted to the Council for preliminary consideration until all Member
States have been duly notified of it, and a period of three months has
elapsed after such notification.
ARTICLE 6
SIGNATURE
This Protocol shall be signe d by duly authorised representatives of Member States.
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ARTICLE 7
RATIFICATION
This Protocol shall be ratified by the signatory Member States in accordance with
their constitutional procedures.
ARTICLE 8
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Protocol shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the
instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the Member States.
ARTICLE 9
ACCESSION
This Protocol shall remain open for accession by any state subject to Artic1e 8 of
the Treaty.
ARTICLE 10
DEPOSITARY
The original texts of this Protocol and all instruments of ratification and accession
shall be deposited with the Executive Seeretary, who shall transmit certified copies
to all Member States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, the Heads of State or Government of SADC
Member States have signed this Protocol.
DONE at (venue), this (date) day of (month) (year) in two (2) original texts in the
English and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA
REPUBLIC OF MALAWI
REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
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